Marquette Law Review
Volume 62
Issue 1 Fall 1978

Article 1

Insurability of Punitive Damages
Robert C. Burrell
Mark S. Young

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Robert C. Burrell and Mark S. Young, Insurability of Punitive Damages, 62 Marq. L. Rev. 1 (1978).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol62/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Vol. 62

Fall 1978

No. 1

INSURABILITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
ROBERT C. BURRELL*

MARK S. YOUNG**

I.

INTRODUCTION

The issue of whether a person can be insured for liability
arising from punitive damages has been presented with increasing frequency and has been decided with conflicting results both in Wisconsin and throughout the country. This issue
presents two fundamental issues-first, whether standard insurance policy language includes punitive damages within its
coverage and second, whether public policy prohibits such coverage. Analysis of these issues involves vital concepts of insurance contract interpretation, the operation of the doctrine of
punitive damages and consideration of special situations such
as vicarious liability for punitive damages.
The numerous jurisdictions which have now considered the
issue are fairly evenly divided on the question of the insurability of punitive damages.' In addition to the judicial considera* B.A. 1968, University of Northern Iowa; J.D. 1971, University of Iowa; Shareholder of the law firm of Borgelt, Powell, Peterson & Frauen, S.C., Milwaukee, Wisconsin; member, State Bar of Wisconsin.
** B.S. Ch. E. 1973, University of Illinois; J.D. 1976, Marquette University; Associate of the law firm of Borgelt, Powell, Peterson & Frauen, S.C., Milwaukee, Wisconsin; member, State Bar of Wisconsin.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of W. Ted Tornehl, senior student at Marquette University Law School, in the preparation of this article.
1. Courts in the following cases, not involving vicarious liability, have permitted
insurance coverage for punitive damages: Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut.
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 244 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957) (applying South Carolina law);
General Cas. Co. of America v. Woodby, 238 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1956) (applying Tennessee law); Fagot v. Ciravola, 445 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. La. 1978) (applying Louisiana law,
but with respect to punitive damages awarded in federal action based upon 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; Louisiana does not permit punitive damages); Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Hills, 345 F. Supp. 1090 (D. Me. 1972); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Janich,
3 F.R.D. 16 (S.D. Cal. 1943); Employers Ins. Co. v. Brock, 233 Ala. 551, 172 So. 671
(1937); American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Werfel, 230 Ala. 552, 162 So. 103 (1935); Price
v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972); Greenwood
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tion of punitive damages, the issue has also been subjected to
the numerous conflicting views of various commentators. 2 The
Cemetery, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 238 Ga. 313, 232 S.E.2d 910 (1977); Continental Ins. Cos. v. Hancock, 507 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. 1974); Wolff v. General Cas. Co. of
America, 68 N.M. 292, 361 P.2d 330 (1961); Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or.
199, 567 P.2d 1013 (1977); Morrell v. LaLonde, 45 R.I. 112, 120 A. 435 (1923); Carroway
v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters
Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964); Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Wallgren, 477 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); Lipscombe v. Security Ins. Co., 213
Va. 81, 189 S.E.2d 320 (1972) (uninsured motorist coverage); see Reynolds v. Willis,
209 A.2d 760, 763 (Del. 1965).
In the following cases of nonvicarious liability, the courts have not permitted insurance coverage for punitive damages: American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523 (10th
Cir. 1966) (applying Kansas law and denying coverage on public policy grounds);
Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962) (applying Florida and Virginia law and denying coverage on public policy grounds); Universal Indem.
Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776 (1934) (coverage denied essentially under
contract language with reference to public policy); Gleason v. Fryer, 30 Colo. App. 106,
491 P.2d 85 (1971) (coverage denied under contract language); Brown v. Western Cas.
& Sur. Co., 484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971) (coverage denied under contract
language); Nicholson v. American Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1965) (coverage denied on public policy grounds); Caspersen v. Webber, 298
Minn. 93, 213 N.W.2d 327 (1973) (coverage denied under contract language); Crull v.
Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) (coverage denied under contract language
and on public policy grounds); Teska v. Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co., 59 Misc. 2d 615, 300
N.Y.S.2d 375 (1969) (coverage denied on public policy grounds); Esmond v. Liscio, 209
Pa. Super. Ct. 200, 224 A.2d 793 (1966) (coverage denied on public policy grounds);
see Tedesco v. Maryland Cas. Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941).
There is no disagreement with the proposition that one may be insured for punitive
damages for which he or she is vicariously liable. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Reichard, 404 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1968) (applying Florida law); Glen Falls Indem. Co. v.
Atlantic Bldg. Corp., 199 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1952) (applying South Carolina law); Ohio
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934) (applying Missouri law),
cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1935); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 420 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (applying Indiana law); Southern Farm Bureau
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W. 2d 582 (1969); Sterling Ins. Co. v.
Hughes, 187 So.2d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick,
Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501, 511 P.2d 783 (1973); Scott v. Instant
Parking, Inc., 105 111. App. 2d 133, 245 N.E.2d 124 (1969); Colson v. Lloyd's of London,
435 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968).

2. See, e.g., 7 & 8 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 4312, 4900 (1962
& Supps. 1972, 1973); D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9, at 216-17
(1973); J. GmAlu, PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES IN WISCONSIN, ch. 3 (1964); R. KEETON,
BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 5.3(f) (1971); 1 R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY
INSURANCE § 1.27, at 1-81 (1976); H. OLECK, DAMAGES TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY § 275C,
at 560 (1961); Conley & Bishop, Punitive Damagesand the General Liability Insurance
Policy, 25 FED'N INS. COUNSEL Q. 309 (1975); Gonsoulin, Is An Award of Punitive
Damages Covered Under An Automobile or Comprehensive Liability Policy?, 22 Sw.
L.J. 433 (1968); Kendrigan, PublicPolicy's ProhibitionAgainst InsuranceCoveragefor
Punitive Damages, 1969 INS. COUNSEL J. 622; Logan, Liability Insurance Protection
From Punitive Damages, in THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 23 (Def. Research
Inst. 1969); Long, Insurance ProtectionAgainst Punitive Damages, 32 TENN. L. REv.
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developing wealth of analysis makes available a complete consideration and a rational resolution of the question of the insurability of punitive damages.
Resolution of the issue is now imminent in Wisconsin in
light of the recent Wisconsin Supreme Court decision in
Cieslewicz v. Mutual Service Casualty Insurance Co. 3 In
Cieslewicz, the court considered the insurability of punitive
damages in the context of insurance coverage for treble damages imposed by section 174.04 of the Wisconsin Statutes, a dog
bite statute. The court found that the standard insurance policy coverage for "all sums which the Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury" was
sufficiently broad to give the insured a reasonable impression
that such treble damages were covered. However, the court
carefully distinguished statutory multiple damages from common-law punitive damages and specifically deferred decision
on whether common-law punitive damages could be insured
against. Speaking solely in the dog bite context, the court concluded that since such insurance coverage would not destroy
the elements of deterrence and punishment, public policy did
not provide a basis for voiding part of the insurance contract
which the policyholder had reasonably believed provided coverage. Thus, the insurer was found liable for both the compensatory and multiple statutory damages. Of additional interest
in Cieslewicz, the court commented that as a result of statements it made in Bielski v. Schulze,4 a question exists as to
whether common-law punitive damages are available for negligent torts in Wisconsin.5 Of course, the availability of punitive
damages is a vital consideration as to their insurability.
Although Cieslewicz may be read by some as a harbinger
that common-law punitive damages may be insured against,
dicta within Cieslewicz indicates that when the issue is presented, the court will refuse on public policy grounds to permit
such coverage. The authors submit, based upon analysis of
573 (1965); Zuger, Insurance Coverage of Punitive Damages, 53 N.D.L. REv. 239
(1976); Note, Insurancefor Punitive Damages: A Reevaluation, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 431
(1976); Comment, Insurer'sLiability for PunitiveDamages,14 MQ. L. REv. 175 (1949);
Note, Insurance Coverage and the Punitive Award in the Automobile Accident Suit,

19 U. Prrr. L. Ray. 144 (1957). See also Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 343 (1968).
3. 84 Wis. 2d 91, 267 N.W.2d 595 (1978).
4. 16 Wis. 2d 1, 17-18, 144 N.W.2d 105, 113 (1962).
5. Cieslewicz v. Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91, 101 n.4, 267 N.W.2d
595, 600 n.4 (1978).
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opposing positions on this issue, that unless punitive damages
are limited in their availability to intentional torts, public
policy forbids insurance coverage for common-law punitive
damages.
This article will first briefly explore the theory of punitive
damages in Wisconsin; then the question of coverage under
policy terms will be considered, followed by an examination of
the public policy considerations. Finally, the public policy argument and the distinguishing features of Cieslewicz will be
analyzed in presentation of the authors' thesis that one may
not be insured against liability for punitive damages.
II.

THE DOCTRINE OF COMMON-LAW PUNITIVE DAMAGES

The theory and historical development of the doctrine of
punitive damages has been the subject of considerable commentary in Wisconsin.' This article is not intended to provide
an all encompassing primer on this doctrine, but rather, to
provide a framework within which the questions relating to the
insurability of punitive damages can be discussed.
Because this article is primarily concerned with insurance
coverage for common-law punitive damages, it necessarily assumes such damages are available. The fact however is, that
while the availability of punitive damages appears to be solidly
imbedded in the common law of most states including Wisconsin, punitive damages are not, in the absence of statute, permitted in four states.7 Courts and legal commentators continue, long after the adoption of the doctrine of common-law
punitive damages, to question the wisdom and efficacy of the
doctrine, and the abolition of punitive damages has been vigor8
ously advocated.
6. Ghiardi & Koehn, Punitive Damages in Strict Liability Cases, 61 MARQ. L. REv.
245 (1977); Ghiardi, Punitive Damages in Wisconsin, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 753 (1977);
Walther & Plein, Punitive Damages: A CriticalAnalysis: Kink v. Combs, 49 MARQ.
L. Rav. 369 (1964); Wickhem, The Rule of Exemplary Damages in Wisconsin, 2 Wis.
L. REv. 129 (1923).
7. Louisiana (McCoy v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 175 La. 487, 143 So. 383, cert.
denied, 287 U.S. 661 (1932)); Massachusetts (Ellis v. Brockton Pub. Co., 198 Mass.
538, 84 N.E. 1018 (1908)); Nebraska (Riewe v. McCormick, 11 Neb. 261, 9 N.W. 88
(1881)); Washington (Walker v. Gilman, 25 Wash. 2d 557, 171 P.2d 797 (1946)).
8. See, e.g., Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 216, 223-26, 567 P.2d
1013, 1021, 1025, 1026 (1977) (majority and dissenting opinions); Jones v. Fisher, 42
Wis. 2d 209, 222-27, 166 N.W.2d 175, 182-84 (1969) (dissenting opinion); 1 R. LONG,
THE LAW OF LBILrrY INSURANCE § 1.27, at 1-81 (1976); Ghiardi, The Case Against
Punitive Damages, 8 FORUM 411 (1972); Note, Insurance for Punitive Damages: A
Reevaluation, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 434-35 (1976).
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The doctrine of punitive or exemplary damages was originally adopted in Wisconsin in the 1854 decision of McWilliams
v. Bragg.9In Bragg the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court's instruction that the jury had "a right to give damages as a punishment to the defendant, for the purpose of making an example, and as a warning to him and others.' ' 0 The
purpose of punitive damages as a punishment to.the defendant
and as a deterrent to other potential tortfeasors has been consistently reiterated by the court."
Although since its adoption the rule of punitive damages
has remained in Wisconsin law, it has been repeatedly criticized by various members of the supreme court. Chief Justice
Ryan in Bass v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway12 expressed
his regret that the court had adopted the rule and expressed his
views about its inequities. He lamented: "But the rule was
adopted as long ago as 1854 in McWilliams v. Bragg, . . . and
has been repeatedly affirmed since. It is therefore too late to
overturn it by judicial decision. That could well be done now
by legislative enactment only."' 3 Two years later the Chief Justice declared that "the rule of punitive damages so long and so
generally established is a sin against sound judicial principle
• . ." and expressed that his negative attitude toward the rule
14
was sanctioned by every present member of the court.
This discontent of the Wisconsin Supreme Court with the
rule of punitive damages did not cease with the comments of
Chief Justice Ryan. In 1914, Justice Timlin, at times writing
only for himself and at times for the majority of the court,
termed aspects of the doctrine illogical. 5 Much more recently
Justices Robert W. Hansen and Leo B. Hanley have expressed
9. 3 Wis. 424 (1854).
10. Id. at 425.
11. Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 697, 271 N.W.2d 368, 379
(1978); Herrmeyer v. Kleeman, 76 Wis. 2d 410, 414, 251 N.W.2d 445, 447 (1977);

Lawrence v. Jewell Cos. Inc., 53 Wis. 2d 656, 661, 193 N.W.2d 695, 698 (1972); MidContinent Refrigerator Co. v. Straka, 47 Wis. 2d 739, 746, 178 N.W.2d 28, 32 (1970);
White v. Benkowski, 37 Wis. 2d 285, 290, 155 N.W.2d 74, 77 (1967); Kink v. Combs,
28 Wis. 2d 65, 81, 135 N.W.2d 789, 798 (1965); Malco v. Midwest Aluminum Sales,
Inc., 14 Wis. 2d 57, 66, 109 N.W.2d 516, 521 (1961); Gladfelter v. Doemel, 2 Wis. 2d
635, 647, 87 N.W.2d 490, 497 (1958); Morse v. Modem Woodmen of America, 166 Wis.
194, 203, 164 N.W. 829, 833 (1917); Craker v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 36 Wis.
657, 678 (1875).
12. 42 Wis. 654 (1877).

13. Id. at 673.
14. Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282, 286, 288 (1878).
15. Luther v. Shaw, 157 Wis. 234, 238, 147 N.W. 18, 19 (1914).
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doubts about the "public policy involved in thus placing in
private hands the use of punishment to deter."'"
Although the belief persists that the judicially created rule
of common-law punitive damages may only be changed by the
legislature,' 7 the present court does not experience the same
qualms in changing this or other court made doctrines.'8 Indeed, in Bielski v. Schulze'9 the court abolished the doctrine of
gross negligence and stated that it realized this destroyed the
basis for punitive damages in negligence cases. 0 The court's
statement makes clear its view that punitive damages are no
longer available in actions for other than intentional torts. No
case in Wisconsin since Bielski has involved an award of punitive damages in a negligence action, and the recent cases in
which the court has considered punitive damages exemplify
Wisconsin's conservative approach to the doctrine. The court
has placed great emphasis upon the necessity for outrageous
and intentional conduct.2 1'
16. Jones v. Fisher, 42 Wis. 2d 209, 226, 166 N.W.2d 175, 184 (1969) (dissenting
opinion). See also Dalton v. Meister, 52 Wis. 2d 173, 188 N.W.2d 494 (1971) (dissenting
opinion), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 934 (1972).
17. See, e.g., Templeton v. Graves, 59 Wis. 95, 98, 17 N.W. 672, 672 (1883).
18. See May v. Skelly Oil, 83 Wis. 2d 30, 38, 264 N.W.2d 574, 578 (1977); Bielski
v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 17-18, 114 N.W.2d 105, 113-14 (1962).
19. 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
20. The court stated:
We recognize the abolition of gross negligence does away with the basis for
punitive'damages in negligence cases. But punitive damages are given, not to
compensate the plaintiff for his injury, but to punish and deter the tortfeasor,
and were acquired by gross negligence as accoutrements of intentional torts.
Wilful and intentional torts, of course, still exist, but should not be confused
with negligence. See sec. 481, p. 1260, Restatement, 2 Torts. The protection of
the public from such conduct or from reckless, wanton, or wilful conduct is best
served by the criminal laws of the state.
Id. at 18, 114 N.W.2d at 113.
21. See Entzminger v. Ford Motor Co., 47 Wis. 2d 751, 757-58, 177 N.W.2d 899,
903 (1970); Kink v. Combs, 28 Wis. 2d 65, 79, 135 N.W.2d 789, 797 (1965). In
Entzminger the court stated:'
Punitive damages are not allowed for a mere breach of contract, White v.
Benkowski (1967), 37 Wis. 2d 285, 291, 155 N.W.2d 74; Gordon v. Brewster
(1858), 7 Wis. 309 (*355), or for all torts or for crimes but generally for those
personal torts, which are malicious, outrageous or a wanton disregard of personal rights which require the added sanction of a punitive damage to deter
others from committing acts against human dignity. See: Jones v. Fisher(1969),
42 Wis. 2d 209, 166 N.W.2d 175; Malco v. Midwest Aluminum Sales (1961), 14
Wis. 2d 57, 109 N.W.2d 516; Ghiardi, Exemplary or Punitive Damages in
Wisconsin, Vol. 1, No. 1, Wisconsin Continuing Legal Education Series (1961).
The type of cases allowing punitive damages has been cases of assault and
battery, slander and libel, seduction, malicious prosecution, breach of promise,
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At least one Wisconsin federal district court judge has
held that in Wisconsin punitive damages are available only in
cases involving intentional torts.22 This conclusion has also
been reached by a leading Wisconsin tort law commentator2s
and by at least one trial court. 2 Additionally, in Cieslewicz, the
court indicated its appreciation of the effect of its statements
in Bielski, but referred to the question of the availability of
punitive damages as an open one. 21
Although the authors believe punitive damages are clearly
unavailable in the absence of outrageous and intentional conduct, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has not yet been faced
with that specific issue. Thus, this article analyzes the availability of such damages for both negligent and intentional conduct. In the following consideration of the insurability of punitive damages it must be emphasized that the rules regarding
the nature of the conduct for which punitive damages are available are inextricably entwined with the analysis as to whether
the insurance policy covers, by its terms, punitive damages,
and whether public policy forbids such coverage.
and the like. Despite repeatedcriticism of the punitive-damage rule, this court
has adhered to it but has refused to extend the doctrine. However, in a most
recent case, the court did lay down, as an additional requirement,that where
no actualmalice is shown the characterof the offense must have the outrageousness associated with serious crime. Jones v. Fisher,supra.
47 Wis. 2d at 757-58, 177 N.W.2d at 903 (footnotes omitted and emphasis added).
22. Walbrun v. Berkel, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (Judge Warren).
Contra, Drake v. Wham-O Mfg. Co., 373 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (Judge Gordon).
23. Ghiardi & Koehn, Punitive Damages in Strict Liability Cases, 61 MARQ. L.
Rav. 245, 246 (1977) (Professor James D. Ghiardi).
24. Granger v. Smeal Mfg. Co., No. 76-CI-0200 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Wash. County, filed
Apr. 27, 1978) (memorandum decision granting motion to strike claim for punitive
damages).
25. The court stated in a footnote:
We note that it is an open question whether punitive damages may be
awarded in Wisconsin in the context of a negligent tort. When we abolished the
doctrine of gross negligence in Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 18, 114 N.W.2d
105 (1962), we used language that can be read as suggesting that punitive damages are inappropriate in negligence cases. The commentators, however, have
not read this language as precluding punitive damages in those cases. Walther
& Plein, Punitive Damages: A CriticalAnalysis: Kink v. Combs, 49 Marq. L.
Rev. 369, 374 (1965); Ghiardi [Punitive Damages in Wisconsin], supra, 60
Marq. L. Rev. [753] at 758.
84 Wis. 2d at 101 n.4, 267 N.W.2d at 600 n.4. In citing Professor Ghiardi's article, the
court overlooks his subsequent statements in Ghiardi & Koehn, Punitive Damages in
Strict Liability Cases, 61 MARQ. L. Rav. 245, 249 (1977), where it is stated punitive
damages may not be awarded in the absence of intentional conduct.
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COVERAGE UNDER POLICY LANGUAGE

Before facing the public policy issues involved, any discussion of the insurablity of punitive damages must necessarily
begin with the applicable insurance policy language. As in
Cieslewicz, the general insuring language of most property and
liability policies provides coverage for "all sums which the Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because
of bodily injury." The threshold question is whether this general language encompasses punitive damages. The existence
and development of specific insurance policy exclusions for
punitive damages must then be analyzed.
While a few courts have held that because punitive damages are awarded as punishment to the defendant and as a
deterrent to others, they arise from the grievous conduct of the
defendant and not "because of bodily injury, ,2 the majority of
courts hold that the general insuring language includes coverage for punitive damages.? The typical policy language is either considered broad enough to include punitive damages or
at least sufficiently ambiguous to resolve the issue in favor of
coverage. For example, in Carroway v. Johnson21 the South
Carolina court interpreted a typical automobile liability policy
as providing coverage for punitive damages. The court found
that the punitive damages were clearly a sum the insured was
"legally obligated to pay" and found that such obligation arose
because of bodily injury since the lawsuit itself was the result
29
of the bodily injuries suffered by the plaintiff.
In order to find that the language of typical insurance policies covers punitive damages, courts and commentators have
often referred to the reasonable expectations of the insured. In
26. Caspersen v. Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 100, 213 N.W.2d 327, 331 (1973); Brown
v. Western Cas. and Sur. Co., 484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Crull v. Gleb, 382
S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964). In Crull the Missouri court stated:
There is no language in the policy that provides for the payments of judgments
for punitive damages. The policy covers only damages for bodily injury and
property damages sustained by any person. Punitive damages do not fall in this
category. The $2,000 award of punitive damages to plaintiff was to punish defendant for his wrongful acts and as a warning to others. It was not to compensate plaintiff for bodily injury or property damages.
382 S.W.2d at 23.
27. See generally Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 343 (1968).
28. 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965).
29. Id. at 205, 139 S.E.2d at 910. See also Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hills, 345
F. Supp. 1090 (D. Me. 1972); Price v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 108 Ariz.
485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972); Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark, 849,
440 S.W.2d 582 (1969).
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Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., the court
stated that the average policyholder would reasonably expect
this typical language to provide protection against all claims
based on injuries not intentionally inflicted." This theme was
reiterated by a leading treatise on insurance:
[I]t is clear that the average insured contemplates protection against claims of any character caused by his operation
of an automobile, not intentionally inflicted. When so many
states have guest statutes, in which the test of liability is
made to depend upon wilful and wanton conduct, or when
courts, in effort to get away from contributory negligence of
the plaintiff, permit a jury to find a defendant guilty of wilful
and wanton conduct where the acts would clearly not fall
within the common law definitions of those terms, the insured expects, and rightfully so, that his liability under those
circumstances
will be protected by his automobile liability
31
policy.
In conjunction with the reasonable expectation of the insured, most courts have also relied upon a rule of insurance
contract interpretation that policies are to be liberally construed in favor of coverage and any ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the insured. 2
Recently, for example, the Supreme Court of Oregon noted
the contract ambiguity and went further to state that the insurer could have removed the ambiguity by a specific contract
exclusion:
Upon the application of these rules to the provisions of this
insurance policy, we hold that such provisions were ambiguous, at the least, so as to require the resolution of any reasonable doubts against the insurance company; that upon reading the policy provisions as set forth above, and in the absence of any express exclusion of liability for punitive damages, a person insured by such a policy would have reason to
suppose that he would be protected against liability for "all
sums" which the insured might become "legally obligated to
pay" and that the term "damages" would include all damages, including punitive damages which became, by judgment, a "sum" that he became "legally obligated to pay."
Defendant insurance company could have removed this
30. 214 Tenn. 639, 648, 383 S.W.2d 1, 5 (1964).
31. 7 J. APLEMAN, INSURACE LAw AND PRAcriCE § 4312, at 132-33 (1962).

32. See, e.g., Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co.,
95 Idaho 501, 507, 511 P.2d 783, 789 (1973) (observing the Idaho rule in that regard).
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ambiguity easily by including an express exclusion from liability for punitive damages, but apparently chose not to do
so. As stated by Appleman, supra [7 J. Appleman, Insurance
Law and Practice sec. 4312](at 86 Supp.), "there is nothing
in the insuring clause that would forewarn an insured that
if indeed, such was
such was to be the intent of the parties,"
33
the intent of the insurance company.
In order to emphasize that wilful, wanton or reckless behavior on the part of the insured should not be and was not intended to be covered by insurance, and apparently in response
to those courts holding that unless excluded, punitive damages
were to be covered, a specific punitive damages exclusion was
formulated by the insurance industry.34 The exclusion was formulated by the Insurance Services Office, the insurance industry's national statistical rating and advisory organization.
The punitive damages exclusion endorsement was intended
to become effective November 1, 1977, in all property and liability insurance contracts. However, the exclusion failed to receive the national acceptance sought by the Insurance Services
Office; as of March 1978, thirty-three jurisdictions, including
Wisconsin, had approved the endorsement, five had rejected it
and approval was still pending in nineteen states. 5 A number
of insurers, however, including Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, The Hartford Group and Employers Mutual Insurance
3
of Wausau, declined to use the exclusion endorsement. 1
In all probability, the rejection by the insurers resulted from
their belief that punitive damages were already clearly beyond
the policy coverage and a specific exclusion was thus unnecessary and undesirable. Because the desired nationwide industry
approach was not effected, the Insurance Services Office on
March 29, 1978, withdrew the exclusion from all jurisdictions
including those thiry-three jurisdictions which had approved
it. The news release announcing the withdrawal noted the vari33. Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 205, 567 P.2d 1013, 1015 (1977).
34. Insurance Information Institute, Insurance Services Office News Release
(March 29, 1978). See also Ghiardi & Koehn, Punitive Damages in Strict Liability
Cases, 61 MARQ. L. REv. 245, 250-51 (1977) (citing J. of Com., Aug. 23, 1977, at 10,
col. 1).
35. Insurance Information Institute, Insurance Services Office News Release
(March 29, 1978).
36. Additionally, at least five national agent association members of the National
Insurance Producers Conference disapproved of the exclusion endorsement because of
marketing concerns. The Nat'l Underwriter, March 31, 1978, at 1.
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ance among the states regarding the basis for punitive damages
and stated that language of the insurance contract may not be
the most practical means of attaining a nationally uniform
exclusion of punitive damages .37 The net result of the Insurance
Services Office action means that no nationally utilized punitive damages insurance policy exclusion exists today.
Even absent an express insurance policy exclusion for punitive damages, it still remains arguable that the general language of most insurance policies ought not be considered to
cover punitive damages. Such damages are certainly beyond
mere damages "because of bodily injury;" they arise because
of the defendant's aggravated conduct. Nevertheless, the primary contention supporting coverage appears to be centered on
37. The news release stated:
In November 1977, ISO introduced an endorsement stating specifically that
coverage for punitive damages is excluded from property and liability insurance
contracts filed or recommended by ISO on behalf of its affiliated companies.
This endorsement was introduced to emphasize that wilful and wanton behavior on the part of the insured should not be and is not intended to be covered
by insurance as coverage for such behavior is clearly contrary to public policy.
The basis for assessing punitive damages, however, varies from state to state,
and many have expressed the view that the wording of our endorsement is not
appropriate for all circumstances.
Adoption of the ISO endorsement varied by insurer, by line of business, and
by individual risk and some insurers did not adopt the endorsement at all. In
addition, consideration of the endorsement is still pending in 19 states. This has
resulted in substantial confusion and dislocation in the marketplace for the
public, insurers and producers.
Accordingly, ISO will immediately withdraw the amendatory endorsement
from all jurisdictions, including those 33 jurisdictions which have approved the
endorsement.
While reaffirming the objective of our original action, ISO recognizes the
prevailing view within the insurance marketplace that the language of the insurance contract may not be the most practical means of accomplishing our goal.
However, an uncontrolled escalation of punitive damages awards may cause
serious insurance and financial problems for many policyholders and add considerable cost to the consumers of goods and services. ISO believes that the
complex issue of the circumstances under which punitive damages should be
awarded, the standards governing appropriate and reasonable amounts and the
insurability of such awards should be addressed through established legislative
and judicial procedures.
We therefore urge all insurance trade associations and other trade associations representing business and industry, as well as insurance producer associations and individual insurers, to seek promptly legislative action which will
achieve the necessary reform.
ISO stands ready to make its services available to appropriate interests in
the development of such legislative programs.
Insurance Information Institute, Insurance Service Office News Release (March 29,
1978).
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the mere existence of a legal controversy whether the typical
language includes punitive damages. The argument based
upon the reasonable expectations of the insured and rules of
construction of insurance policies essentially asserts that the
existence of a dispute as to whether the policy language covers
punitive damages attests to the ambiguity of the language,
thus requiring construction of the policy in favor of coverage.
The typical policy language, it is claimed, does not forewarn
the insured that there is no coverage for punitive damages.
Because the insurer drafted the policy and could have made
clear its intention to exclude coverage for punitive damages,
the rules of construction require it to bear the burden of the
ambiguity.
In Wisconsin the insurance coverage question has apparently been resolved in favor of the insured. In Cieslewicz the
Wisconsin Supreme Court found the language "all sums which
the Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages
because of bodily injury" extensive enough to cover statutory
multiple damages. The court cited the rules that ambiguities
must be resolved against the insurer and that the policy must
be construed as it would be understood by a reasonable person
in the position of the insured. It concluded that "[a] reasonable person in the position of the insured would believe that the
language of the policy provides coverage against all civil liability arising out of an occurrence resulting in bodily injury." 38 In
response to the appellant insurance company's argument that
the multiple damages were not compensatory and therefore did
not arise "because of bodily injury," the court said: "It is the
infliction of bodily injury which gives rise to the cause of action.
Once the cause of action arises, punitive or multiple damages
are awarded in connection with, or because of, the injuries
391
incurred.
Although the Wisconsin court, as later discussed in this
article, clearly distinguished between the coverage provided for
statutory multiple damages and the issue of coverage for common-law punitive damages, its discussion of the insurance
policy language is equally applicable to both. Therefore, it can
be expected that when the Wisconsin court considers the issue
of coverage for common-law punitive damages, it will rule that
38. 84 Wis. 2d at 98, 267 N.W.2d at 598.
39. Id. at 97, 267 N.W.2d at 598.
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the typical liability coverage clause is ambiguous and thus
broad enough to cover punitive damages.
IV. PUBIUC POLICY
The crucial issue in any punitive damages coverage discussion is whether public policy permits insurance coverage for
such damages. Prior to 1962, when Judge John Wisdom wrote
his now famous opinion in NorthwesternNational Casualty Co.
v. McNulty,4" the public policy issue had received little attention by the courts. Analysis of the early cases shows the courts
were primarily concerned with whether the insurance contract
language provided coverage for punitive damages. Public policy was not usually an issue. Prior to 1962, courts blithely held
that liability insurance contracts covering legal liability included coverage for punitive as well as compensatory damages.4
A few early cases, however, did foreshadow the rationale
applied in McNulty that public policy forbids insurance coverage for common-law punitive damages. In Universal Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Tenery,4 2 the Colorado court concluded,
on policy interpretations grounds, that the terms of an insurance policy did not cover punitive damages. The court, however, did indicate that its decision of denying coverage for
punitive damages was somewhat motivated by the public
policy that the wrongdoer should not be permitted to shift the
burden of punishment. The court stated:
This award was primarily for the punishment of Callahan for
his wrongful acts and as a warning to others. It was in nowise
compensation to the injured party for bodily injuries or actual
loss occasioned by the negligence of Callahan. The insurance
company did not participate in this wrong, and was under no
contract to indemnify against such. In this particular matter
the policy indemnifies against damages for bodily injuries,
and nothing in addition is contracted for, and there is no
further liability. The injured will not be allowed to collect
40. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
41. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 244
F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957); General Cas. Co. of America v. Woodby, 238 F.2d 452 (6th
Cir. 1956); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Janich, 3 F.R.D. 16 (S.D. Cal. 1943);
American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Werfel, 231 Ala. 285, 164 So. 383 (1935); Morrell v.
LaLonde, 45 R.I. 112, 120 A. 435 (1923).
42. 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776 (1934).
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from a nonparticipating party for a wrong against the public. , ,
Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty Co." also contains an early
expression of the doctrine that public policy prohibits coverage
for punitive damages. Noting that in Connecticut exemplary
damages were not intended to be compensatory, but were
rather designed to serve as punishment for the defendant, the
court reasoned:
A policy which permitted an insured to recover from the insurer fines for a violation of a criminal law would certainly
be against public policy. The same would be true of a policy
which expressly covered an obligation of the insured to pay a
sum of money in no way representing injuries or losses suf-

fered by the plaintiff but imposed as a penalty because of a
public wrong. 5
The argument based on the public policy's prohibition
against coverage for punitive damages fully matured in
McNulty, which arose out of an automobile accident in Florida. The injured McNulty was awarded $37,500 in compensatory damages and $20,000 in punitive damages by the jury's
verdict. In an ancillary garnishment action against the tortfeasor's insurer, Northwestern National Casualty Company,
McNulty received summary judgment up to the $50,000 policy
limits, and the insurer appealed from that part of the judgment
holding it liable for punitive damages. Concluding that public
policy forbids insurance coverage for punitive damages, the
court found it unnecessary to construe the insurance contract
language .4
In developing the public policy rationale, Judge Wisdom
first examined the character of punitive damages and determined that both generally and under the applicable Florida
law, such damages were a penalty, imposed as punishment to
deter the defendant and others from certain conduct, and were
to no significant extent compensation. The court next considered and illustrated the weak precedential value of the numerous cases holding that an insurer was obligated to pay punitive
damages."
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 17, 39 P.2d at 779.
127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941).
Id. at 537, 18 A.2d at 359.
307 F.2d at 434.
Id. at 435-36. McNulty noted that in both American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v.
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Proceeding to a discussion of public policy's prohibition of
coverage, Judge Wisdom concluded:
Where a person is able to insure himself against punishment
he gains a freedom of misconduct inconsistent with the establishment of sanctions against such misconduct. It is not disputed that insurance against criminal fines or penalties
would be void as violative of public policy. The same public
policy should invalidate any .contract of insurance against the
civil punishment that punitive damages represent.
The policy considerations i4 a state where, as in Florida
and Virginia, punitive damages are awarded for punishment
and deterrence, would seem to require that the damages rest
ultimately as well [as] nominally on the party actually responsible for the wrong. If that person were permitted to shift
the burden to an insurance company, punitive damages
would serve no useful purpose. Such damages do not compensate the plaintiff for his injury, since compensatory damages
already have made the plaintiff whole. And there is no point
in punishing the insurance company; it has done no wrong.
In actual fact, of course, and considering the extent to which
the public is insured, the burden would ultimately come to
rest not on the insurance companies but on the public, since
the added liability to the insurance companies would be
passed along to the premium payers. Society would then be
punishing itself for the wrong committed by the insured."
In every discussion of prohibiting insurance coverage for
punitive damages because of public policy, it is necessary to
distinguish those cases in which the insured is vicariously liable
for punitive damages. Such cases, of course, deal with the situation of punitive damages against an employer for an injury
caused by an employee. It is generally accepted that public
policy does not prevent the employer's insurance from covering
Werfel, 231 Ala. 285, 164 So. 383 (1935), and Morrell v. LaLonde, 45 R.I. 112, 120 A.
435 (1923), the courts failed to consider public policy. Further, the decision in Werfel
is weakened by the unique rule in Alabama that any damages for wrongful death are
purely punitive. Judge Wisdom noted that in Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers'
Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 244 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957), the plaintiff had obtained
a lump sum judgment of $10,000 against the insured including both compensatory and
punitive damages. The plaintiff then sought recovery from the insurer on a $5,000
policy. The court in Thornton was faced with a situation where it could not determine
what portion of the judgment was punitory; the compensatory damages alone probably
exceeded the $5,000 limit, and it could not order a new trial between the plaintiff and
the insured. Thus, the court in Thornton was confronted with an all-or-nothing decision. 307 F.2d at 438-39.
48. 307 F.2d at 440-41.
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this liability." Judge Wisdom in McNulty explained the distinction of the vicarious liability cases by stating "if the employer did not participate in the wrong the policy of preventing
the wrongdoer from escaping the penalties for his wrong is inapplicable."5 0
McNulty is thus the leading case for the proposition that
public policy prohibits coverage for punitive damages. The
leading contrary case is Lazenby v. Universal UnderwritersInsurance Co.,5 ' decided by the Supreme Court of Tennessee. The
plaintiff, injured in an autoinobile accident, was awarded
$1,087.00 in punitive damages. Finding the insurer liable for
punitive damages, the court questioned the basic proposition
that punitive damages are a deterrent to wrongful conduct:
We . . .are not able to agree the closing of the insurance

market, on the payment of punitive damages, to such
[socially irresponsible] drivers would necessarily accomplish
the result of deterring them in their wrongful conduct. This
state, in regard to the proper operation of motor vehicles, has
a great many detailed criminal sanctions, which apparently
have not deterred this slaughter on our highways and streets.
Then to say the closing of the insurance market, in the payment of punitive damages, would act to deter guilty drivers
would in our opinion contain some element of speculation. 2
49. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Reichard, 404 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1968) (applying
Florida law); Glen Falls Indem. Co. v. Atlantic Bldg. Corp., 199 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1952)
(applying South Carolina law); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th
Cir. 1934) (applying Missouri law), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1935); Norfolk & W.
Ry. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 420 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (applying
Indiana law); Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d
582 (1969); Sterling Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 187 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Abbie
Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501, 511 P.2d
783 (1973); Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 105 Ill. App. 2d 133, 245 N.E.2d 124 (1969);
Colson v. Lloyd's of London, 435 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968).
50. 307 F.2d at 440. In Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58, 60 (8th
Cir. 1934), the court put it this way:
[Ilt might well be said that it would be against public policy to permit a person
to protect himself in advance against the consequences of intentional wrongdoing injurious to others. A different situation is present where the sole liability
of the insured arises out of the relation of master and servant . ...
In this situation where there is no direct or indirect volition upon the part of
the master in the commission of the act, no public policy is violated by protecting him from the unauthorized and unnatural act of his servant.
A rebuttal to this distinction by those courts which follow McNulty was made in
Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 212-14, 567 P.2d 1013, 1019-20 (1977).
51. 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
52. Id.at 647, 383 S.W.2d at 5.

1978]

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Noting that the courts and authorities have concluded that
it is not contrary to public policy to insure oneself against
liability for ordinary negligence, the court in Lazenby argued
that denial of coverage on public policy grounds would be arbitrary, because of the difficulty in distinguishing between ordinary negligence and negligence of the type justifying an award
of punitive damages.53 The court further observed that it was
the rule of a majority of courts that the policy language covered
punitive damages and that public policy should only be the
basis of decision when the public policy is clear and unequivocal. Reasoning that the public policy basis in McNulty was not
clear, the court concluded that the insurance contract and reasonable expectation of the insured should control.5
Thus, McNulty and Lazenby set forth the basic arguments
on each side of the public policy debate and can be considered
the first generation of decisions dealing with this question. In
numerous recent cases since these decisions, courts have in
large measure followed the basic rationale of either McNulty
or Lazenby, with the issue reduced primarily to a choice between either (1) coverage based on the reasonable expectations
of the insured or (2) no coverage since insurability would defeat
the fundamental purpose of punitive damages. Because this
choice is essentially one between two irreconcilable options, the
courts have, in rationalizing their determination, closely examined many of the underlying aspects of each of the two competing principles. For example, in American Surety Co. of New
York v. Gold,5" the court refuted the Lazenby argument that
punitive damages were not a deterrent by stating: "The question is not so much the efficacy of the policy underlying punitive damages; rather it is a question of the implementation of
that policy. Permitting the penalty for the misdeed to be levied
on one other than he who committed it cannot possibly implement the policy." 56
The position taken in Lazenby that it is too difficult to
distinguish between ordinary negligence and wanton or reckless negligence, and therefore insurance coverage would only be
arbitrarily denied was countered by the court in Gold thusly:
"We must assume, however, any given jury will accurately fol53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 648, 383 S.W.2d at 5.
Id.
375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1966).
Id. at 527.
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low the law and correctly distinguish liability for ordinary from
liability for gross and wanton negligence. To hold to the con5
trary would impugn the integrity of the jury system.
Since 1970, the majority of courts considering this issue
have sided with the Lazenby rationale, and it has been suggested that a trend in that direction is developing. 8 In Price v.
HartfordAccident and Indemnity Co.,59 for instance, insurance
coverage was permitted by the Arizona court. Although
Lazenby was cited, the Price court emphasized its own reasoning that even though a tortfeasor is insured for punitive damages, he or she cannot engage in reckless conduct with impunity because of criminal sanctions, the threat of increased
insurance rates and the possibility that the punitive damages
will exceed the limits of coverage. The court also stressed its
conclusion that a reasonable insured would have expected coverage under the policy language. 0 The Lazenby approach was
also adopted, without independent reasoning, by the Idaho
Supreme Court in Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v.
United States Fire Insurance Co.6
The Supreme Court of Oregon, in a four-three split decision, recently allowed coverage for punitive damages in Harrell
v. Travelers Indemnity Co."2 Both the majority and dissenting
opinions present strong bases for. their conclusions. The majority, quoting from its earlier opinions, affirmed its position that:
"A contract to indemnify the insured for damages he is forced
to pay as a result of an intentionally inflicted injury upon
another should not be regarded as contrary to public policy
unless the fact of insurance coverage can be related in some
substantial way to the commission of wrongful acts of that
character.* *" (Emphasis added) 3
In the same vein as the Lazenby argument that punitive damages are not a deterrent, the court in Harrell apparently indicates its belief that there is no evidence that coverage would
57. Id.
58. See Note, Insurancefor Punitive Damages: A Reevaluation, 28 HASTINGS L.J.
431, 443-45 (1976).
59. 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972).
60. Id. at 487, 502 P.2d at 524.
61. 95 Idaho 501, 511 P.2d 783 (1973).
62. 279 Or. 199, 567 P.2d 1013 (1977).
63. Id. at 207, 567 P.2d at 1016-17 (quoting Isenhart v. General Cas. Co., 233 Or.
49, 52-53, 377 P.2d 26, 27 (1962)).
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make outrageous and intentional conduct damages more probable.
The majority in Harrell then focused upon the types of conduct subject to an award of punitive damages. In Oregon punitive damages were not limited to intentional, wanton or wilful
acts but extended to include any conduct which could be found
to constitute gross negligence. Unfortunately, the rationale of
the public policy argument did not attach to merely grossly
negligent conduct. Thus, to deny coverage for all punitive damages, on the grounds of public policy, would unfairly and arbitrarily deny coverage to defendants whose conduct was found
only to be grossly negligent. 4
The Harrell court rejected the McNulty rationale that it iswrong to shift the penalty of punitive damages to the innocent
insurance company. Responding that insurance companies
could charge an extra premium for punitive damage coverage,
the court stated:
Thus, in the event that an insured who has a contract of
insurance which includes coverage for punitive damages incurs a judgment for punitive damages, he does not "shift the
burden" of that judgment to an unsuspecting insurance company so as to "punish it" and, through it, to "punish society."
Instead, he and others desiring to contract for that additional
coverage have presumably paid additional premiums for such
coverage, so as to provide a separate fund of moneys collected
by the insurance company for the express purpose of paying
such judgments, without "punishment" to either the insurance company or "society." ' 5
The majority in Harrell additionally pointed out that it
believed the exception of cases involving vicarious liability
from the public policy prohibition of coverage to be an inconsistency in the theory that coverage should not be permitted. The
court stated that the policy of punitive damages imposed vicariously upon an employer is also one of deterrence intended to
encourage the employer to exercise tighter control over his
employees, and, therefore, it is illogical for those who argue
public policy forbids insurance coverage because the purpose
64. Id. at 208-12, 567 P.2d at 1017-19. The court also noted the difficulty in
distinguishing between conduct which justifies only compensatory damages and that
which also justifies punitive damages as a reason coverage would be arbitrarily excluded. Id.
65. Id. at 213, 567 P.2d at 1019-20.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1

of deterrence would be frustrated to except insurance coverage
for vicarious liability for punitive damages."
Finally, the Harrellmajority suggested various alternatives
to the legislature:
There may be other alternatives that would be preferable to
the present state of the law in Oregon on the subject of punitive damages, such as:
(1) The complete elimination of punitive damages;
(2) Some limitation upon the amount of awards for
punitive damages;
(3) A limitation of liability for punitive damages to
flagrant
misconduct, such as intentionally inflicted injury. 7
The court concluded by emphasizing the reasonable expectations of the insured and that public policy considerations were
inadequate to forbid coverage. In a final footnote responding to
the dissenting opinions, the majority stated: "[Tihe essence
of our disagreement arises from the fact that awards of punitive
damages are not limited to wanton or intentional misconduct,
but extend to conduct that is grossly negligent or reckless.""6
Justice Holman, with Chief Justice Denecke concurring,
filed a strong dissent, refuting every aspect of the Harrellmajority opinion. The dissent focused upon purpose of punitive
damages, noted the jury instructions that such damages be
awarded in an amount proper to deter the conduct, and commented that the jury had decided that the proper amount to
deter was $25,000.00, not the amount of an insurance premium. 9 In the opinion of the dissenters, the majority's reliance
upon the reasonable expectation of the insured was misplaced.
Justice Holman advised that while it might be proper to assume that the insured expected to be covered, the analysis
should not end there. He stated: "I see nothing reasonable or
desirable in protecting the insured's expectation of being above
the law of punitive damages." ' "
66. Id. at 214-15, 567 P.2d at 1020. The court further seemed to indicate it believed
it would be unfair to require the individual nonemployer to bear the burden of punitive
damages but to allow an employer which is affluent enough to be able to insure against
punitive damages or wise enough to incorporate to shift that burden.
67. Id. at 216, 567 P.2d at 1021.
68. Id. at 218 n.22, 567 P.2d at 1022 n.22.
69. Id. at 220, 567 P.2d at 1023 (dissenting opinion).
70. Id. at 223, 567 P.2d at 1024 (dissenting opinion).
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Challenging the argument that there is no evidence that
punitive damage effects deterrence, Justice Holman stated: "I
would expect punitive damages to have a deterrent effect. If
they would not, there is no reason for their existence and they
7
should be abolished." '
Also discounted was the argument that less affluent tortfeasors, if denied coverage, would be threatened with financial
ruin. The majority had failed to consider that for precisely that
reason the law of punitive damages requires the wealth of a
defendant be considered by the jury in awarding such damages. 72 Further, the dissenters noted, the allowance of insurance
coverage is a determination which does not favor less affluent
defendants, but rather the more affluent and knowledgeable
who will obtain such coverage.
Justice Holman also argued that it was the court's responsibility, not the legislature's, to deal with the problem which
underlies the entire issue of coverage for punitive damages-the law of punitive damages itself.
In its concluding summary, the majority pays lip service
to the idea of limiting or eliminating punitive damages. It
suggests that this might be a matter best left to the legislature, presumably in its next session two years from now. If
there is a problem with the scope of punitive damages in
Oregon, it has been created by this court, and this court
should attempt to solve it. In the past this court has at least
limited punitive damages to cases in which they served the
public policy of deterrence. In the present case it abandons
that limitation. Instead, it is satisfied to allow the foresighted
and affluent to place themselves above the policy of the law
of punitive damages through the purchase of insurance, while
the less foresighted and less affluent remain subject to the
law as before. This73 is a solution which I cannot, in good
conscience, accept.
As previously noted, the Wisconsin case of Cieslewicz v.
Mutual Service Casualty Insurance Co. 71 sheds considerable
light upon the issue of insurability of punitive damages in Wisconsin. Holding that insurance coverage for statutory multiple
damages is permitted, the court relied upon a number of the
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 225, 567 P.2d at 1025 (dissenting opinion).
Id.
Id. at 225-26, 567 P.2d at 1026 (dissenting opinion).
84 Wis. 2d 91, 267 N.W.2d 595 (1978).
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basic arguments made by those who have concluded that public policy does not forbid coverage for common-law punitive
damages. After recognizing the public policy argument of
McNulty, the court referred to the policy of protecting an insured's expectations:
"Public policy" is no magic touchstone. This state has
more than one public policy. Another and countervailing
public policy favors freedom of contract, in the absence of
overriding reasons for depriving the parties of that freedom.
Still another public policy favors the enforcement of insurance contracts according to their terms, where the insurance
company accepts the premium and reasonably represents or
implies that coverage is provided.'
In the context of the tort associated with dog bites, the court
argued that allowing coverage would not destroy the elements
of deterrence and punishment of statutory multiple damages.
The court pointed out that section 174.01 permitted the killing of a dog during an attack on a person," and commented
that it would be expected that owners of dogs, or at least of
dogs that have attacked a person, would be required to pay
higher insurance premiums and that there was always the
possibility the statutory multiple damages would exceed the
policy limits.77 Higher premiums would not shift the burden
upon insurance companies and the public, but rather upon dog
owners, and would avoid the potentially devastating financial
impact of multiple damages upon the less affluent, the court
stated.
In avoiding setting precedent on coverage for punitive damages, the Wisconsin court distinguished statutory multiple
damages from common-law punitive damages by noting three
primary differences:
The first important distinction between common law punitive and statutory multiple damages is the differing levels
of culpability required to warrant the additional damages. In
the context of an intentional tort, punitive damages are
awarded when the tort has the character of outrage frequently
associated with crime . . . . In the multiple damages statutes, however, no particular state of mind or outrageous character of the conduct is necessary at all . . ..
Another distinction between common law punitive and
75. Id. at 103, 267 N.W.2d at 601.
76. See Wis. STAT. § 174.01 (1975).
77. 84 Wis. 2d at 103-04, 267 N.W.2d at 601.
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statutory multiple damages is in the mode of assessment.
Common law punitive damages are assessed in the discretion
of the jury, and the plaintiff has no absolute entitlement to
punitive damages in any case . . . . Multiple damages, on
the other hand, are assessed whenever the statutory requirements are met ....
A final distinction rests in the differing methods of calculation of the damages. In the case of common law punitive
damages, the wealth of the defendant must be considered, as
this has an important bearing on the sufficiency of punishment . . . . Wealth, however has nothing to do with the
assessment of statutory multiple damages. Rich and poor pay
the same amount, as the statute provides simply for an automatic multiplier of the compensatory damages."
The distinctions drawn by Cieslewicz between punitive
damages and statutory multiple damages7" are paramount on
the issue of public policy and the insurability of punitive damages. Additionally, the court's question regarding the availability of punitive damages in negligence cases, as noted earlier in
this article,"0 indicates its concern over the propriety of such
damages.
The above discussi6n has set forth the precedential authority on the question of the insurability of punitive damages both
nationally and in Wisconsin. The next section will attempt to
demonstrate that if punitive damages are to be allowed, it is
absurd that insurance coverage for them be permitted. All of
the arguments favoring coverage are essentially arguments that
punitive damages be abolished or limited to intentional torts.
Thus, the wisest course which suggests itself for Wisconsin is
the limitation of punitive damages to actions involving outrageous and intentional torts (a course upon which the Wisconsin
court has already embarked in Bielski v. SchuIze), and thereafter the denial of insurance coverage for such conduct and the
damages resulting therefrom.
V.

ANALYSIS

Most statements by courts and commentators who favor
insurance coverage for punitive damages betray the actual view
that the doctrine of punitive damages itself is outmoded and
78. Id. at 101-02, 267 N.W.2d at 600-01 (footnotes and citations omitted).
79. See 84 Wis. 2d at 101-03, 267 N.W.2d at 600-01.
80. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
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unjustified and, therefore, that a defendant should not be required to carry this additional burden. This distaste for punitive damages, coupled with the expectation of the reasonable
insured, is the impetus for the conclusion that coverage should
be allowed. This approach is illogical and, as a result, the arguments raised against the public policy prohibition of coverage
are to a large degree fabricated to reach a desired result. These
arguments simply cannot refute the basic premise that insurance coverage for punitive damages is directly in conflict with
the purpose of punitive damages.
In Harrell v. Travelers Indemnity Co. the court raised the
question of whether public policy as a doctrine is sufficiently
adequate to singlehandedly void an otherwise valid policy provision granting coverage for punitive damages.'" As the Harrell
dissenters pointed out, however, public policy's direction of the
outcome in legal controversies is not new. In Wisconsin in negligence cases, the court will deny liability upon public policy
grounds where the injury is too remotely caused by the negligence. 2 The Wisconsin court has held contractual terms freely
agreed to by parties may be unenforceable as contrary to public
policy.83 It has been generally recognized for some time that it
is contrary to public policy to indemnify an insured for losses
arising out of the commission of an intentional act which
causes damage to another 4 or to insure a person for liability for
a criminal fine.8 5 Wisconsin has continually recognized the

public policy of deterrence and punishment as the purposes of
punitive damages. 86 As the above discussion illustrates, the
notion that public policy forbids insurance coverage for puni81. See text accompanying notes 62-73 supra.
82. See, e.g., Howard v. Mt. Sinai Hospital Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 515, 217 N.W.2d 383,
219 N.W.2d 576 (1974); Hass v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 48 Wis. 2d 321, 327, 179
N.W.2d 885, 888 (1970).
83. See, e.g., Holsen v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 52 Wis. 2d 281, 284, 190 N.W.2d
189, 191 (1971); Marquette Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Village of Twin Lakes, 38 Wis. 2d
310, 315, 156 N.W.2d 425, 427 (1968); Pedrick v. First Nat'l Bank, 267 Wis. 436, 439,
66 N.W.2d 154, 155 (1954); Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 126, 42 N.W.2d 500, 501
(1950).
84. 7 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4312, at 129 (1962); 9 G. COUCH,
COUCH ON INSURANCE § 39:15 (2d ed. 1966); 1 R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE
§ 1.26, at 1-76 (1976).
85. 7 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4252, at 3 (1962); 1 G. COUCH,
COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1:36 (2d ed. 1966); R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE §
1.26, at 1-78 (1976).
86. See cases cited note 11 supra.
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tive damages was considered long before McNulty in 1962.87 To
state that public policy prohibits insurance coverage for punitive damages would not require the adoption of any new rule
of public policy by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, but rather
simply a statement of what the public policy is and how it
operates in this context. Moreover, insurance coverage prohibition would be consistent with Wisconsin's attitude toward punitive damages.
It has occasionally been contended that punitive damages
are compensatory in some sense and therefore coverage would
not be contrary to public policy." A variation of this argument,
made by the respondents in Cieslewicz, is that punitive damages in Wisconsin are considered punishment for a private
wrong and go to the injured party by way of private damages. 9
If, indeed, punitive damages are in any way compensatory,
they should be abolished as extra compensation to which the
injured is not entitled in light of the liberalization of the rules
of compensatory damages to include damages for such items as
wounded feelings and sense of insult." Moreover, that punitive
damages are privately awarded does not alter the public policy
of their purpose of deterrence and punishment. Regardless of
the origin or nature of common-law punitive damages in a
particular case, their primary purpose is completely unrelated
to compensation and is totally frustrated by insurance coverage.
In many of the judicial opinions concluding punitive damages are insurable, the courts express concern that punitive
damage awards threaten to render tortfeasors insolvent for conduct which is less grievous than intentional conduct, such as
where the conduct is wanton or reckless. 9' The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Cieslewicz refers to the "devastating financial
impact" that statutory multiple damages may have on particular individuals. 2 Because of this concern, courts seem more
motivated to permit coverage. However, this motivation is ill87. See text accompanying notes 42-45 supra.
88. See Note, Insurancefor Punitive Damages:A Reevaluation, 28 HASTINGS L.J.
431, 441-43 (1976).
89. Brief of Plaintiffs-Respondents at 10-11, Cieslewicz v. Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins.
Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91, 267 N.W.2d 595 (1978). See also J. GHIARD!, PERSONAL INJURY
DAMAGES IN WISCONSIN

§ 3.04, at 42-43 (1964).

90. See Ghiardi, The Case Against Punitive Damages, 8 FORUM 411, 412 (1972).
91. See, e.g., Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. at 215, 567 P.2d at 1020-21.
92. 84 Wis. 2d at 104, 267 N.W.2d at 601.
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founded because the doctrine of punitive damages permits the
jury to consider the wealth of the tortfeasor in determining the
sufficiency of the punishment, and a defendant may introduce
evidence of his or her limited financial resources. " Even if the
threat of insolvency were a valid concern, it would not favor
coverage of punitive damages, but rather would challenge the
wisdom of the punitive damages doctrine itself.
The contention that insurance coverage for punitive damages unfairly shifts the penalty to the insurance companies and
the public" is often countered by the reasoning that the penalty
is not unfairly shifted to the insurance company because it has
received a premium with which to pay for such damages. In
Harrell v. Travelers Indemnity Co., the Oregon court stated
that the insurer is free to include or exclude coverage for punitive damages and correspondingly adjust the premium." ' Thus,
the burden is placed upon a separate fund of moneys collected
by the company from those who desire such coverage. In
Cieslewicz the Wisconsin Supreme Court commented that coverage for statutory multiple damages for dog bites would result
in persons similarly situated, dog owners, paying higher premiums and sharing the burden." Based on this reasoning it
could be argued that the policyholders in general do not have
to subsidize those guilty of aggravated conduct and thus are
not unfairly strapped with the burden of punitive damages.
This reasoning, however, ignores several practical considerations. Appleman, in a leading treatise on insurance law, has
noted that the public would soon render unsaleable an insurance policy exclusion of punitive damages: "The author does
not expect many decisions upon similar clauses in the future,
because as soon as the public became educated by competing
agents to the limitations upon that policy, the public would
refuse to accept it, and it would be unsaleable." 7 After all, will
insureds be willing to accept and share the risk of damages
determined on the basis of another's intentional or outrageous
93. Dalton v. Meister, 52 Wis. 2d 173, 181-82, 188 N.W.2d 494, 499 (1971); Jones
v. Fisher, 42 Wis. 2d 209, 220-21, 166 N.W.2d 175, 181 (1969); Fuchs v. Kupper, 22
Wis. 2d 107, 111-12, 125 N.W.2d 360, 363 (1963); Ghiardi, Punitive Damages in
Wisconsin, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 753, 767-69 (1977).
94. See Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440-41 (5th Cir.
1962).
95. 279 Or. at 213, 567 P.2d at 1019-20.
96. 84 Wis. 2d at 103-04, 267 N.W.2d at 601.
97. 7 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 4312, at 137 (1962).
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conduct; the amount of which is dependent on the coinsured's
wealth? In fact, the insurance industry has, for practical reasons and because of its view that punitive damages are not
presently covered by the general coverage clause, declined national utilization of such an exclusion in insurance policies."
The result, therefore, is that if coverage is permitted, the burden will not be restricted to those who specially pay for it, but
rather will be placed upon all policyholders. Even more importantly, those who dispute the argument that insurance coverage will not shift the burden of punitive damages to the insurance companies and thus to the public, ignore the foundation
of punitive damages: i.e., that tortfeasors whose conduct justifies the imposition of punitive damages should not be permitted to spread the risk of what is intended to be personal punishment.
One of the major arguments in favor of coverage questions
whether punitive damages actually serve as a deterrent. First
raised in Lazenby, this argument reasons that since even criminal laws fail to slow the frequency of personal injury on the
highways, how much less so can punitive damages serve as a
deterrent.9 At the outset, this contention sidesteps the insurability issue. The vitality of punitive damages depends upon
their functioning as a deterrent. Wisconsin, in fact, has recognized that punitive damages do serve as a deterrent. 0° Absent
this deterrent function, punitive damages themselves must be
eliminated, or at least limited to cases where a deterrent effect
can be assumed.' °1 Certainly, if punitive damages are not paid
by the tortfeasor, they fail to punish or deter the tortfeasor.
The position that punitive damages are not a deterrent carries more weight when applied to punitive damages awarded
for unintentional conduct which is reckless, wanton or grossly
negligent. In Wisconsin, however, because punitive damages
are unavailable in actions based upon anything other than intentional conduct, this position has no application. Even assuming that punitive damages could be available in the future
for unintentional acts, this lack of a deterrent function fails to
98. See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra.
99. 214 Tenn. 639, 647, 383 S.W.2d 1, 5 (1964).
100. Kink v. Combs, 28 Wis. 2d 65, 81, 135 N.W.2d 789, 798 (1965). See also cases
cited note 11 supra.
101. See Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. at 223-25, 567 P.2d at 1025
(dissenting opinion); American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523, 527 (10th Cir. 1966).
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address the insurance coverage issues. 01 2
Some courts have also suggested that insurance coverage for
punitive damages would not totally eliminate the punishment
and deterrence intended to be effected.'0 3 It is noted that a
tortfeasor, insured for punitive damages, may still be subject
to criminal sanctions, increased insurance premiums and the
threat that the damages will exceed the policy limits. The Wisconsin court cited similar factors in permitting coverage in
Cieslewicz.'°4 However, the deterrence effected by these long
range possibilities would not be as great as it would be if the
tortfeasor is required personally to pay the punitive damages.
That such other deterrents are present, in any event, does not
rationalize the emasculation of the doctrine of punitive damages by permitting the tortfeasor to deflect the punishment.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court was previously advised:
"Punitive damages ought to serve its purpose."'0 5 As Justice
Holman stated in his dissent in Harrell: "The. . .arguments
which seek to minimize the deterrence aspect of punitive damages, or to substitute deterrence from some other source, fail
to recognize that if punitive damages are not themselves a
deterrent, there is no rationale to support them in the first
place." 0 '
In virtually every decision where the court concludes in
favor of coverage, the reasonable expectation of the insured is
referred to as a major consideration of the court.' 7 In
Cieslewicz the Wisconsin court clearly placed great reliance
upon the policy against voiding insurance coverage for which
the insured presumably paid a premium.' 8 The reasonable
expectation of the insured, however, is primarily a rule for the
construction of insurance policies. It is implemented in determining whether the contract between the insurer and insured
102. In Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962), the court doubted
the deterrent effect of the doctrine of gross negligence was a factor in the abolition of
the doctrine itself. Id. at 18, 114 N.W.2d at 113.
103. See, e.g., Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 487, 502 P.2d
522, 524 (1972); Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. at 207-08, 567 P.2d at 1017.
104. 84 Wis. 2d at 103-04, 267 N.W.2d at 601.
105. Malco, Inc. v. Midwest Aluminum Sales, Inc., 14 Wis. 2d 57, 66, 109 N.W.2d
516, 521 (1961).
106. 279 Or. at 228, 567 P.2d at 1027 (dissenting opinion).
107. See, e.g., Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 487-88, 502
P.2d 522, 524-25 (1972); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639,
648, 383 S.W.2d 1, 5 (1964).
108. 84 Wis. 2d at 103, 267 N.W.2d at 601.
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includes certain terms. Therefore, reliance upon the insured's
reasonable expectations in public policy analysis is misplaced,
because even where it may be assumed that the insurance contract language explicitly provided coverage for punitive damages, public policy would prohibit coverage, because the purpose of punitive damages demands they be paid by the tortfeasor. The classic analogy to be drawn is the situation of an
insurance policy expressly covering an insured for liability for
criminal fines. Undoubtedly such coverage would be void as
against public policy, even though the insured paid for an expected coverage." 9 Likewise, a person has no right to contract
for and expect insurance coverage which puts him or her above
the law of punitive damages.""
One argument raised in favor of coverage by the court in
Lazenby"' and the majority in Harrell"2 is that it is too difficult
to distinguish between the kinds of conduct which do and do
not justify the award of punitive damages. The argument follows that since the distinction between ordinary negligence and
wanton, reckless or grossly negligent conduct is blurred, the
denial of coverage for punitive damages would be necessarily
arbitrary. This argument, as noted above, was rebutted by the
statement in American Surety Co. of New York v. Gold that it
must be assumed the jury will accurately follow the law and
properly distinguish the types of conduct."' Moreover, the contention that the jury will not be able to differentiate between
conduct which is only simple negligence and that which justifies punitive damages is again an argument for the abolition or
limitation of punitive damages. Underlying this argument is
the fact that it is the imposition of punitive damages by the
jury in the first place which would be arbitrary, not the denial
of coverage. If a jury cannot rationally differentiate between
the varying degrees of conduct, punitive damages should be
eliminated or limited solely to intentional torts. An alternative
remedy would be to abolish any differentiation between
PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES IN WISCONSIN § 3.04, at 42-43 (1964); 7
PRACTICE § 4252, at 5 (1962); 1 R. LONG, THE LAW OF
LIABILITY INSURANCE § 1.26, at 1-78 (1976).
110. Nicholson v. American Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1965); Harrell v. Travelers Inden. Co., 279 Or. at 222-23, 567 P.2d at 1024
(dissenting opinion).
111. 214 Tenn. at 648, 383 S.W.2d at 5.
112. 279 Or. at 208-12, 567 P.2d at 1017-19.
113. 375 F.2d 523, 527 (10th Cir. 1966).
109.

J.
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"gross" and ordinary negligence. Such a course has already
been adopted in Wisconsin.
A number of the above arguments which are made in favor
of insurance coverage for punitive damages evidence concern
for the insured tortfeasor in the gray area between intentional
conduct, for which punitive damages are generally available,
and ordinary negligence, for which punitive damages are unavailable. The concern is with the state of mind of one who acts
recklessly, wantonly or grossly negligently. Although one who
acts in such a fashion is presumed to have a certain amount of
awareness of the flagrant nature of the conduct, this awareness
does not approach the mens rea associated with intentional
acts. With respect to this type of conduct, courts favor coverage
because they are sympathetic to the tortfeasor's situation of
personally incurring large punitive damages as a result of an
unguarded moment in which he or she commits an act determined to be more than ordinary negligence. Under such circumstances, the courts also doubt that permitting coverage of
punitive damages would frustrate the function of deterrence
since the tortfeasor may have acted without thinking or, at
least, acted unintentionally.
Therefore, it is apparent that courts would have no difficulty accepting a denial of insurance coverage for punitive
damages where punitive damages are assessed as a result of
intentional conduct. Indeed, most liability insurance policies
exclude coverage for intentional acts; and at least one state by
statute forbids coverage for intentional acts."4 Moreover, it is
recognized that public policy prohibits a person from protecting him or herself in advance by insurance against the consequences of intentional wrongdoing.' Again, any difficulty in
114. See CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 1972).
115. 7 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4312, at 129 (1962). An interesting collateral issue, upon which one federal district court has recently ruled, is whether
public policy forbids insurance against liability for racially discriminatory employment
practices under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, (42 U.S.C. §
2000e) and the Civil Rights Act of 1870 (42 U.S.C. § 1981). In Union Camp Corp. v.
Continental Cas. Co., No. CV476-167 (S.D. Ga., filed June 27, 1978) the court held
public policy does not prohibit such coverage and denied a motion to dismiss the
complaint of an employer against its insurer to recover, under an insurance policy,
back pay awards incurred by the employer in settlement of a race discrimination class
action. The insurance policy expressly provided coverage for discrimination. The holding of the court is primarily based upon the reasoning that the action for back pay
against the employer was not based upon intentional discrimination, that it is only
speculative that permitting coverage would encourage discrimination, and that allow-
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the assessment of punitive damages as a result of conduct
which falls between ordinary negligent acts and intentional
acts is a defect in the doctrines of intentional versus negligent
conduct and should be dealt with directly, not by providing
insurance coverage for all punitive damages. If punitive damages were limited to intentional torts, the unsettled issue of
insurance coverage for punitive damages would evaporate.
This problem should not arise in Wisconsin, because the
state supreme court has, the authors believe, eliminated punitive damages for any conduct other than intentional wrongdoing. With the abolition of the doctrine of gross negligence in
Bielski v. Schulze, ' Wisconsin law now treats conduct previously labelled as wanton, reckless or grossly negligent as ordinary negligence. Thus, in Wisconsin the arguments in favor of
insurance coverage which essentially grow out of a court's uneasiness in imposing punitive damages with respect to conduct
which may be, in terms of culpability, more than simply negligent, but less than intentional, are not applicable.
The ways in which punitive damages differ from multiple
statutory damages as noted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court
in Cieslewicz1 7 are significant in that they illustrate reasons
why punitive damages should not be covered by insurance,
whereas statutory multiple damages should be. First, the court
noted that the imposition of the two types of damages differs
in the necessary level of culpability of the tortfeasor. Under the
multiple damages dog bite statute involved in that case, a
tortfeasor is essentially guilty of statutorily defined negligence,
while punitive damages are awarded for intentional torts which
have the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.
The state of mind of the tortfeasor liable for punitive damages
calls for a greater amount of punishment and deterrence, making insurance coverage less desirable. Additionally, one liable
for such multiple damages is probably unwittingly so, and a
court is reluctant to impose such a punishment for less than a
deliberate wrong.
The second and third distinctions between statutory multiple damages and punitive damages relate to how and to what
ance of coverage would avoid financial ruin of the employer and supply the mandated
compensation.
116. 16 Wis. 2d 1, 18, 114 N.W.2d 105, 113 (1962). See text accompanying notes
19-25 supra.
117. 84 Wis. 2d at 101-04, 267 N.W.2d at 600-01.
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degree they are assessed. Multiple damages are under statute
automatic in assessment and amount. A jury is not asked to
assess an appropriate amount. The nature of this imposition of
multiple damages is such that the less affluent defendant needs
insurance coverage to avoid being financially ruined automatically. Punitive damages, on the other hand, are assessed in the
jury's discretion, and upon proper instruction by the court, this
method of assessment not only is designed to avoid an insolvency rendering verdict but also to impose an amount which
appropriately punishes according to the defendant's wealth
and conduct. Further, an excessive award of punitive damages
is judicially reviewable both by the trial court and upon appeal,
while the statutory assessment of multiple damages is not.
The purposes of punishment and deterrence are much more
efficiently implemented by the assessment procedure for punitive damages than by that for statutory multiple damages.
Therefore, while it is not so objectionable that the somewhat
fortuitously imposed multiple damages be covered by insurance, it is senseless, as well as a frustration of the purpose of
punitive damages, to permit an insurance company to pay this
penalty specially tailored to the defendant and his or her conduct.
VI. CONCLUSION
Historically Wisconsin has been a conservative jurisdiction
in regard to the doctrine of punitive damages. The supreme
court has consistently refused to extend the doctrine since its
adoption. Whether punitive damages are available for conduct
which is nonintentional has been stated to be an open question
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Any uncertainty, however,
appears to be due only to the fact that the precise issue has yet
to be presented to the court. The unambiguous statement in
Bielski v. Schulze that the abolition of gross negligence does
away with the basis for punitive damages in negligence cases
makes it clear that under the law of Wisconsin, punitive damages are limited to intentional torts, and were the court presented with the proper case, it would so rule. That decision
would resolve the issue of insurance coverage for punitive damages, because intentional wrongdoing is not generally, and cannot be, insured against by a tortfeasor.
Most of the arguments in favor of insurance coverage for
punitive damages actually are concerned with the difficulty in
the operation of the doctrine of punitive damages itself in the
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area of nonintentional conduct. Courts, thus concerned with
the imposition of such damages upon an unwitting defendant,
permit coverage to relieve the defendant of the burden, but
thereby strip punitive damages of their purpose. Accordingly,
in such cases, the punitive damages which are questionably
imposed lack any justification and are therefore impotent.
Thus, the elimination or limitation of the doctrine of punitive
damages is the reasonable method by which the issue of coverage should be resolved.
If, however, punitive damages are available with respect to
nonintentional torts, as they are in most jurisdictions, insurance coverage must not be permitted. Punitive damages cannot efficiently and effectively serve their intended purposes of
punishment and deterrence if the wrongdoer is permitted to
shift the burden to an insurer. The fact that the insured reasonably expects coverage is not pertinent to the public policy prohibiting such coverage. Coverage should be forbidden as it
would if a liability policy provided coverage for criminal fines
or injuries caused by the insured's intentional conduct.
If punitive damages are to be available in Wisconsin they
must be implemented so as to serve their purpose. Insurance
coverage, if permitted, would frustrate the only justification for
the imposition of punitive damages. Insurance coverage would
transform a doctrine of deterrence and punishment into one
sanctioning awards of windfall amounts to an already adequately compensated third party. Such a result cannot be sanctioned.

